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FEDERAL CouRTS APPEAL AND ERROR DoEs A STATUTE WHICH
AUTHORIZES AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL REQUIRE SucH· APPEAL! A

bill seeking an injunction and an accounting was filed in a United States district court for alleged infringement by defendant of plaintiff's rights in the
words of a song. Defendant's appeal from a decree enjoining further use of
the song and directing an accounting for profits 1 was denied, because the appeal
had been taken more than thirty days after its entry and so the circuit court of
appeals was without jurisdiction.2 The case proceeded to an accounting in the
district court, and a final decree was entered from which defendant appealed
again to the circuit court. Held, the statute 8 which authorizes appeals from interlocutory decrees granting injunctions does not require an aggrieved party to
take such an appeal and, where it is not taken, such failure does not impair the

1 Victor Talking Machine Co. v. George, (C. C. A. 3d, 1934) ·69 F. (2d) 871.
The circuit court, deeming the decree to be final, overruled it on the merits.
2 Georg~ v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 293 U. S. 377, 55 S. Ct. 229 (1934).
The Supreme Court ruled that the decree was interlocutory.
8 Judicial Code, § 129, 26 Stat. L. 828 (1891), as amended by 43 Stat. L.
937 (1925); 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 227: "Where, upon a hearing in a district court,
or by a judge thereof, in vacation, an injunction is granted, continued, modified,
refused, or dissolved by an interlocutory order or decree, or an application to dissolve
or modify an injunction is refused, or an interlocutory order or decree is made appointing a receiver, or refusing an order to wind up a pending receivership or to take
the ;ippropriate steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing a sale or
other disposal of property held thereunder, an appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree to the circuit court of appeals; and sections 346 and 347
of this title shall apply to such cases in the circuit court of appeals as to other cases
therein. The appeal to the circuit court of appeals must be applied for within thirty
days from the entry of such order or decree, and shall take precedence in the appellate
court; and the proceedings in other respects in the district court shall not be stayed
during the pendency of such appeal unless otherwise ordered by the court, or the
appellate court, or a judge thereof."
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right upon appeal from the final decree to challenge the validity of the prior
interlocutory decree. Victor Talking Machine Co. v. George, (C. C. A. 3d,
1939) 105 F. (2d) 697.
Before this case was taken to the circuit court on appeal from the final
decree, an article appeared in the Boston University Law Review 4 dealing
with the question whether, on the facts of the case, defendant could have the
interlocutory decree reviewed on the appeal. The interpretation of the statute
advocated by the author is opposed to that which was given by the third circuit
when it subsequently faced the question. Among the circuits there is a conflict
of views which eventually may have to be settled by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Decisions in the seventh and ninth circuits 5 indicate that those
courts interpret the statute as denying a party who fails to appeal from an interlocutory decree within thirty days the right to be heard on the same issue upon
appeal from the final decree. The principal case and others 8 regard appeal from
an interlocutory decree under the statute as permissive, so that an aggrieved
party may await final determination of the case before raising the issue. The
state courts of Pennsylvania and New Mexico in construing statutes similar
to the federal statute adopt the permissive view.7 In Wisconsin, a statute is
interpreted as making appeal from interlocutory decrees mandatory within the
time stipulated, although here the particular language of the statutes relating
to appeals aids the interpretation. 8 Statutes of California and Montana clearly
4
Porter, "Appeals from Interlocutory and Final Decrees in the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeal," 19 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 377 (1939).
G O'Nate v. Bahr, (C. C. A. 9th, 1933) 67 F. (2d) 180; Coll?-puting Scale Co.
v. Toledo Computing Scale Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1921) 279 F. 648. In neither
decision is there a full discussion of the point; and the latter case is weakened as
authority, since the patent had expired before the interlocutory decree was entered and
the statute prior to its extension by § 227a did not provide for appeal in patent infringement cases except where an injunction was issued.
8
Marden v. Campbell Printing-Press & Manufacturing Co., (C. C. A. 1st, 1895)
67 F. 809; Draper Corp; v. Stafford Co., (C. C. A. 1st, 1918) 255 F. 554; Groblewski v. John Chmiell Co., (C. C. A. 1st, 1919) 264 F. 32_5; Individual Drinking Cup
Co. v. Errett, (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) 297 F. 733; Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffier,
(D. C. Pa. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 393; Scriven v. North, (C. C. A. 4th, 1904) 134
F. 366; Kelsey Wheel Co. v. Universal Rim Co., (C. C. A. 6~, 1924) 296 F. 616.
In Austin-Western Road Machinery Co. v. Disc Grader & Plow Co., (C. C. A. 8th,
1923) 291 F. 301, there is language suggesting the mandatory view, but in A. & R.
Realty Co. v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 703,
the court clearly adopts the permissive view.
7
Bracht v. Connell, 313 Pa. 397 at 401, 170 A. 297 (1934), in which the court
said, "The statute provides a remedy where none theretofore existed. The provisions
are permissive; not mandatory; while an appeal formerly was not allowed, the statute
permits, but does not require, an aggrieved party to accept the advantages therein
given him." Torrez v. Brady, 37 N. M. 105, 19 P. (2d) 183 (1932), noted in
19 VA. L. REv. 736 (1933).
8
Richter v. Standard Mfg. Co., 224 Wis. 121, 271 N. W. 14, 914 (1937).
Wis. Stat. (1937), § 270.54, authorizes appeals from any interlocutory decree substantially disposing of the merits of the case; § 274.01 provides that the time within which
appeal can be taken from any judgment or order is limited to one year; § 274.09
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require the mandatory view, by providing that intermediate orders which are
appealable do not come within the scope of review on appeal from judgments.9
Looking at the federal statute against the background of the law before its passage, it seem~ proper to interpret the language as giving a party the option of
appealing from an interlocutory decree within thirty clays or awaiting final
judgment before questioning the validity of the decree. Prior to the enactment in
1891 of the statute which gave a defendant the right to appeal from an injunction,10 the established rule of procedure was that the appellate court could consider a case only after the trial court had rendered a final decree.11 The statute
was intended to remedy the obvious injustice of requiring a party against whom
an injunction was erroneously decreed to suffer without relief until, after sometimes long and expensive proceedings for account, a final judgment was entered.12 Though a much needed change in procedure, allowing appeal from an
interlocutory decree was a marked departure from the established practice, and
without more definite language it is difficult to construe the statute as making
appeal from the interlocutory decree mandatory. However, objectionable effects
of the permissive view are seen in the principal case. The accounting proceedings
constituted a needless waste of time and money.18 If a party aggrieved by an
interlocutory decree, which will have a bearing on the final decree and from
which the statute permits an appeal,1' wants to challenge its validity, the issue
should be settled before the case proceeds. Though a decree granting an injunction after a full hearing is intermediate in time, it is final in deciding the merits
cf the case. On the appeal from an injunction the court may decide the case
on the merits and render or direct a final decree dismissing the bill.15 A particularly undesirable result of the permissive view appears in cases where the
interlocutory decree is partially in favor of each of the opposing parties, and only
one party appeals from the decree.16 The case could be finally settled by the
stipulates appeals may be taken from interlocutory judgments subject to the same
limitations as from final judgments.
9 Rock Island Plow Co. v. Cut Bank Implement Co., IOI Mont. I 17, 53 P.
(2d) n6 (1935); Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal. (2d) 48, 59 P. (2d) 953 (1936).
10 26 Stat. L. 828 (1891).
11
Keystone Manganese & Iron Co. v. Martin, 132 U. S. 91, IO S. Ct. 32
(1889).
12 Richmond v. Atwood, (C. C. A. 1st, 1892) 52 F. IO at 22; Bissell CarpetSweeper Co. v. Goshen Sweeper Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1896) 72 F. 545 at 547.
18
The case was remanded to the district court in 1934 (supra, note 2) and the
final decree awarding the plaintiff $65,295.56 with interest was not entered until 1938.
H The statute does not exclude appeals from preliminary injunctions granted
upon a prima facie showing, but it is the decree determining the merits of the case
upon a full hearing which the aggrieved party would want to question on appeal from
the final decree, If courts are influenced to adopt the permissive view for the reason
that the statute embraces interlocutory decrees which do not finally determine the
merits of the case, they overlook the fact that such decrees would not be reviewed on
appeal from the final decree anyhow.
15
Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 17 S. Ct. 407 (1896).
16
Porter, "Appeals from Interlocutory and Final Decrees in the United State~
Circuit Courts of Appeal," 19 Bos-r. UNIV. L. REV. 377 at 398 ff. (1939).
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court on the one appeal, but in the way the statute has been construed the
decree will have to be considered again upon the appeal from the final decree, if
the party which had not previously appealed raises the question. If the mandatory view cannot be read into the statute as it is now worded, an amendment
should be passed by Congress requiring a party aggrieved by an interlocutory
decree to appeal from the decree within thirty days or waive the right to raise
the question on appeal from the final decree.

